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Introduction 
With the current terrorist threat facing European Union Member States, including the UK 
coming from those citizens joining terrorist groups such as Islamic state and the Al Qaeda 
affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra Front in Syria, Iraq and Libya, with that threat being of serious 
concern on their return to the home state it is vital that national security and counter-terrorism 
policing agencies have access to detailed flight information. While many states already have 
access to Advanced Passenger Indexes (API),as this article will show the information is 
limited. In 2011 the European Union introduced a draft directive regarding the exchange of 
passenger name record (PNR) but due to concerns over data protection and rights to privacy 
this directive was not introduced. As seen with the Paris attacks in January 2015 and the 
attack in Copenhagen in February 2015, the terrorist threat that was present in 2011 has 
changed. This article will examine the difference in API and PNR information and argue why 
a PNR Directive is needed in the current climate.    
Overview of the Topic 
1. The EU’s Directive on Passenger Name Records 2011/0023- Information contained 
in Passenger Name Records Data. In February 2011 the European Commission 
produced a proposal for a directive on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data 
for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and 
serious crime (2011/0023). At the time of its publication the explanation 
memorandum covered issues as to why the directive was needed by agencies involved 
in investigating terrorism and serious crime where a comparison was drawn between 
PNR and aircraft passenger information (API). PNR’s contain the following 
information: 
1. Name of Passenger; 
2. Contact details for the travel agent or airline office; 
3. Ticketing details; 
4. Itinerary of at least one segment, which must be the same for all passengers listed; 
5. Name of person providing the information or making the booking; 
6. Passenger gender; 
7. Passport details (includes nationality, passport number and date of passport expiry); 
8. Date and place of birth; 
9. Billing information; 
10. Form of payment (include debit/credit card details); 
11. Contact details (potentially include landline/mobile phone numbers); 
12. Frequent flyer data; and 
13. Vendor remarks kept by the airline (International Civil Aviation Organisation (2010) 
Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data Quebec: International Civil 
Aviation organisation).  
This is far more extensive information compared to API’s that only contains a passenger’s 
name, date of birth, gender, nationality and passport details and this limitation was recognised 
by the European Commission in the explanatory memorandum to the PNR Directive saying: 
‘API data does not enable law enforcement authorities to conduct an assessment 
of passengers and therefore do not facilitate the detection of hitherto “unknown” 
criminals or terrorists’ [my emphasis] (2011/0023 Directive p.7). 
While API is useful in terrorism investigations at port and border controls for investigating 
officers to ascertain who is on a flight list that can be checked to suspects already contained 
within intelligence systems, the point being made above is API’s are restrictive when trying 
to ascertain the identity of those who are not known. However the additional information 
contained in the Directive such as who made the booking or contact details and methods of 
payment can be cross-checked to see if there is a connection with terrorist suspect in 
intelligence systems. As stated above, Europol have already found that there are groups 
facilitating the travel of individuals who may referred to in intelligence circles as clean-skins, 
that is they are not on any intelligence system. However if from the PNR data a link is made, 
this will greatly assist the officer in agencies investigating terrorism. The fact that PNR data 
is an important intelligence tool is also recognised in the PNR Directive’s explanatory 
memorandum (Directive 2011/0023 Explanatory Memorandum p.8). 
2. Key Provisions in the 2011 PNR Directive - While clearly stating the scope of use of 
PNR data was the prevention, detection and prevention of terrorist offences and 
serious crime (Directive 2011/0023 article 9) the Directive recommended that 
Member States identified competent authorities to process the PNR data issued form 
Passenger Information Units (Directive 2011/0023, article 5). It is clear that no 
decision should be taken by the competent authority on the basis of a person’s race or 
ethnic origin, religious or philosophical belief, political opinion, trade union 
membership, health or sexual life. One concern with the Directive related to data 
retention was the protection of personal data and the transfer of data to third countries. 
In essence, the proposed period of detention of data by competent authority was 30 
days, with the Passenger Information Unit to retain the data for 5 years (Directive 
2011/0023 article 9). The protection of the data should be covered by the Council 
Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (FD 2008/977/JHA). The data 
subject has the right to expect the competent authority to fulfil their duties regarding 
their duties under the Framework Decision (article 18) and that includes the right for 
the data subject to have a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed to 
them by the applicable national law (FD 2008/997/JHA article 20). Where the PNR 
data is transferred to a third country the Framework Decision makes it clear that it has 
to be ensured that the third country had an adequate level of protection of the intended 
data processing (FD 2008/997/JHA article 14). 
  
3. Concerns Regarding The PNR Directive - The European Parliament expressed 
concerns that the proposed method of automatically processing PNR data using fact 
based pre-determined assessment criteria was very wide and thought that such an 
assessment should never result in , ‘…profiling on the basis of sensitive data’ 
(Directive 2011/0023 Memorandum p.10). In light of current issues regarding terrorist 
groups such as Islamic State, compared to when the PNR Directive was proposed  the 
terrorist threat has escalated in severity since 2011 and is not only real but is 
potentially dangerous to the right to life of EU citizens. This is important as the 
European Data Protection Supervisor also questioned if the PNR Directive was 
necessary and proportionate, with the main concern being the collection of data of 
innocent persons. He criticised the Directive proposal as contributing towards a 
surveillance society (Directive 2011/0023 Memorandum p.10). 
 
4. Concerns Over a Surveillance Society - In April 2013, the Committee on Civil 
Liberties of the European Parliament (LIBE) saw the PNR Directive being too wide 
and consequently refused to agree for the need of the Directive. The concerns mainly 
cantered on Passenger Information Unit as having the potential to refuse to erase a 
person’s data even if they are not suspected of a crime and the Committee had a 
concern the Directive left it open to authorities to carry out offender profiling on 
individuals who matched certain behaviour (The European Citizen 2014). 2013 was a 
year where fears of a surveillance society were confirmed following the revelations by 
the former US National Security Agency (NSA) employee, Edward Snowdon on the 
practices of the NSA and the UK’s General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
in particular Operation PRISM and the bulk surveillance of electronic forms of 
communication and telephone use, some of which was unauthorised (Greenwald 2014 
pp.33-42). The shock waves of the NSA’s actions reverberated around the world, 
more so when it was revealed that politicians in the EU’s Member States were also 
spied on by the NSA, in particular the German Chancellor Angela Merkel (Greenwald 
2014 p. 141). As Greenwald (the Guardian newspaper journalist Snowden passed the 
NSA documentation onto) says, what is more remarkable are the revelations that the 
NSA was spying on millions of  European Citizen adding; 
‘…in addition to foreign leaders the United states … also spied extensively on 
international organisations such as the United Nations to gain a diplomatic 
advantage.’ (Greenwald 2014 p142) 
It is understandable why there is such a concern in recommending further powers of 
surveillance to national security and policing agencies, yet a balance has to be drawn between 
the needs of protecting the interests of security within the EU’s Member States and the rights 
of individual citizens. 
 European Union law is clear that personal data is to be protected. Article 16 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that everyone has the right to 
the protection of personal data concerning them (TFEU C326/55 Article 16(1)) and the 
European Parliament and the Council must act in accordance with ordinary legislative 
procedure that will lay down rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, office and agencies when carrying 
out activities that fall with the scope of EU law (TFEU article 16(2)) as does article 39 in the 
Treaty of Union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also is clear that 
everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them (2000/C 364/01 
Article 8(1)) 8(2)). In that right it states, ‘…data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes on the basis of consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law’ (2000/C 364/01 Article 8(2)) [My emphasis]. This is in addition to the respect 
the state must have for the right of a person to their private and family life in both the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01 Article 7) and the Council of 
Europe’s European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (Article 8). Article 8 of the ECHR 
does allow for the state to interfere with the right to privacy where it is under an act 
proscribed by law and it is necessary in democratic state when it is in the interests of national 
security or to prevent crime or disorder. 
 These projections are upheld in the agreements the European Union has with the 
United States regarding the transfer of PNR (Agreement between the United States of 
America and the European Union on the use and transfer of Passenger Name records to the 
United States Department of Homeland Security 17434/11) and the agreement with Australia 
of PNR data (Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and 
transfer of Passenger name records (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and 
Border Protection Service 10093/11). In the agreement between the US and the EU it states 
the US will confirm that effective administrative, civil and criminal enforcement measures 
are available under US law for privacy incidents and the US Department of Homeland 
Security will take disciplinary action against persons responsible for inappropriate use of the 
privacy conditions (17434/11 article 5(6)). It also says in the agreement that the Department 
of Homeland Security will inform the relevant EU authorities of cases of privacy incidents 
involving PNR of EU citizens (17434/11 article 5(4)). Similar provisions relating to data 
security and integrity also are present in the agreement between the EU and Australia 
(10093/11 article 9) including the separate storing of EU citizens’ PNR data and it is only 
stored for the purpose of matching with intelligence data Australian authorities have on 
persons suspected of being involved in terrorism or serious crime (10093/11 article 9(1)(a)). 
The EU has understandably taken a strict approach as to how intelligence and citizens’ 
personal data is handled and dealt with by state authorities as provided in the European 
Commission’s overview of information management (Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and Council: Overview of information management in the area of 
freedom, security and justice COM(2010)385 final) which concludes saying: 
‘Adopting … a principled approach to policy development and evaluation is 
expected to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of current and future 
instruments in a manner that fully respects fundamental rights.’ (Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council: Overview of 
information management in the area of freedom, security and justice 
COM(2010)385 final, p.28) 
 
This is seen in the current Directive regarding the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences (Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals data 2012/0010 (COD)) that is expected to be introduced in 2016. 
5. New EU Data Protection Regulation and Directive - The EU was looking to amend 
the data protection provisions it currently has in place prior to the Snowden 
revelations, however the EU is looking to introduce changes to take effect by 2016 at 
the latest that will tighten up EU citizens’ data protection, in particular regarding data 
exchange with third countries. The two pieces of legislation proposed are: 
1. Personal data protection regulation: processing and free movement of data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) 2012/0011 COD; 
2. Personal data protection directive: processing of data for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal penalties 
and free movement of data, 2012/0010 COD 
The regulation will have an impact in the private sector as businesses will have to set up new 
processes to facilitate the rights of citizens to access information held on them. Regarding the 
directive the transfer of data to a third country/international organisation will only occur if it 
is for the same purpose as the directive and that organisation is a public authority in a state 
that provides a proper level of data protection within a country where appropriate safeguards 
are established in a legally binding instrument (article 33). 
 Post the January 2015 terrorism events in Europe, the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs 
Commission has brought back on the EU’s legislative agenda a proposal for blanket coalition 
and storage of passenger name record data for up to five years on all records of passengers 
flying in and out of Europe. It is not a given that the plans will become legislation in the EU 
as the vice-chairman of the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee, Jan Philip 
Albrecht sees the plans as an affront, in particular to the EU’s main court, the European Court 
of Justice decision in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espanola de Prrteccion de 
Datos (APED) Case C-131/12, which held in 2014 that data retention without any link to risk 
or suspicion is not proportionate. For Albrecht a plan to blanketly retain all passenger data 
would be open to a breach of fundamental rights would be open to a breach of fundamental 
rights (Travis 2015).  
6. A Proposed New Version of a PNR Directive - While the Directive 2012/0010 (COD) 
is expansive in its coverage of criminal activity it is submitted that a separate directive 
is required to deal with the transfer of PNR. andBuilding on the 2011 draft PNR 
Directive, a new draft text on an EU system for the use of  PNR data was tabled by 
lead Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Timothy Kirkhope (ECR, UK) that 
was discussed in the LIBE Committee on 26 February 2015.  An evaluation of the 
necessity and proportionality of the proposal in the face of current security threats, its 
scope (list of offences covered), retention periods, the inclusion or exclusion of intra-
EU flights, the connection with the on-going data protection reform, as well as the 
consequences of the EU Court of Justice judgement annulling the 2006 data retention 
directive, were among the issues discussed by MEPs. The 2011 Commission proposal 
would require more systematic collection, use and retention of PNR data on 
passengers taking “international” flights (those entering the EU from, or leaving it for, 
a third country), and would therefore have an impact on the rights to privacy and data 
protection. 
The changes proposed by Timothy Kirkhope in the revised draft report include: 
1. The scope of the proposal is narrowed to cover terror offences and serious 
"transnational" crime (the list of specific offences includes, for instance, trafficking 
in human beings, child pornography, trafficking in weapons, munitions and 
explosives); 
2. Sensitive data to be permanently deleted no later than 30 days from the last 
receipt of PNR containing such data by competent authorities. Other data will 
continue to be masked after 30 days; 
3. The inclusion of intra-EU flights (not initially included by the Commission, but 
the Council of the European Union favours the inclusion of internal EU flights); 
4. 100% coverage of flights (the Commission text proposed to reach 100% 
coverage of international flights in gradual steps); 
5. Access to the PNR data continues to be allowed for five years for terrorism, but 
is reduced to four years for serious crime; 
6. Each EU member state should appoint a data protection supervisory officer; 
7. Persons who operate security controls, who access and analyse the PNR data, 
and operate the data logs, must be security cleared, and security trained; 
8. References are made in the text to the EU Court of Justice judgment on data 
retention and to the current EU data protection rules; and, 
9. The period for member states to transpose the directive is extended from two to 
three years (given the specific technological and structural demands of setting up an 
EU PNR system for each member state).  
In addition to Kirkhope’s it is submitted that consideration be given to the following 
points: 
1. Any amended Directive is solely related to terrorism investigations; 
2. The Directive only applies to targeted flights to and from states that border or are 
terrorist conflict zones; 
3. The PNR data is only held by competent authorities (who would be Member States’ 
national security agencies and Counter-Terrorism Policing Departments); 
4. Requests for PNR data on applicable flights is carried out through and by Europol on 
behalf of the respective Member State competent authority requesting the data; 
5. It is necessary that all Member States collect, process and exchange PNR data to 
avoid security gaps as this will contribute towards the security of the EU; 
6. All PNR data is handled in accordance with the provisions of  Article 8 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 16 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and article 39 treaty for Union along with article 8 
ECHR; 
7. The data is pulled from the PNR data solely for matching purposes in relation to 
terrorism intelligence already in the possession of the Member States’ competent 
authorities. The data cannot be requested for sole purpose offender profiling, thereby 
preventing data mining. 
  
In addition to these suggestions, the sections referring to serious crime is omitted 
and by targeting terrorist conflict zones this reduces the concern over data mining 
by Member States’ competent authorities. The main aim of counter-terrorism 
investigations is to prevent terrorist acts from happening and ensuring that EU 
Member States’ citizens are safe. Such a proposal would enhance this capability.   
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